A Muslim’s belief in the ‘fundamentals of religion’ (uṣūl al-dīn) must be based on awareness and knowledge, and they must not follow anyone in the fundamentals of religion. In other words, they cannot accept the word of someone who knows about the fundamentals of religion simply because that person says so. However, in the event that a person believes in the rightful beliefs of Islam and expresses them – even though this may not be based on awareness and knowledge – then that person is a Muslim and a believer, and all the laws (aḥkām) of Islam and the faith are applicable to them. However, in matters concerning the ‘laws of religion’ – apart from those that are indispensable and indisputable – a person must either be a jurist (mujtahid) who is capable of ascertaining laws based on proof, or they must follow a mujtahid, or they must exercise precaution (iḥtiyāṭ) by performing their duty in a way that they are certain to have fulfilled their responsibility (taklīf). For example, if a group of mujtahids consider an act unlawful (ḥarām) and another group say it is not unlawful, the person must not perform that act; and if some consider an act obligatory (wājib) and others consider it recommended (mustaḥabb), they must perform it. Therefore, it is obligatory for those who are not mujtahids and cannot act on precaution to follow a mujtahid.

‘Following a jurist in Islamic laws’ means acting according to a mujtahid’s instructions. Only a mujtahid who is male, of the age of legal responsibility (bāligh), sane (ʿāqil), a Twelver (Ithnā ʿAsharī) Shia, of legitimate birth, dutiful (ʿādil), living,¹ and whose memory is not less than what is normal can be followed. Furthermore, in cases where a person knows, albeit vaguely, that there are differences in the fatwas of mujtahids in matters that are commonly encountered, even though they may not know what these differences are, it is necessary for them to follow the mujtahid who is the most learned (aʿlam), i.e. the one whose knowledge is greater than others and who is more capable of understanding the law (ḥukm) of Allah and the duties determined by reason and Islamic law than all the mujtahids of his time.

A ‘dutiful’ (ʿādil) person is someone who performs the acts that are obligatory for them and refrains from the acts that are unlawful for them. A person who, without a legitimate excuse (ʿudhr), omits an obligatory act or commits an unlawful one is not ʿādil; in this regard, there is no difference between a minor and a major sin. Being dutiful is established for a person in several ways: a. one has certainty (yaqīn) about the person’s dutifulness, or they have confidence (iṭmiʾnān) in it, provided this confidence has been gained through reasonable means; b. two ʿādil persons testify to the person’s dutifulness; c. the person possesses ‘outwardly good character’ (al-ḥusn al-ẓāhir), meaning they appear to be a good person and no violation of religious law is observed in their speech, conduct, or actions; for example, if the local people, their neighbours, or those who associate with them were to be asked about them, they would confirm their goodness and say they are not aware of any violation of religious law by them. It is worth mentioning that the definition of dutifulness and the ways of establishing it do not differ across the various sections of Islamic laws (aḥkām).

Whether a person is a mujtahid and whether a mujtahid is the most learned (aʿlam) can be identified in one of three ways: 1. a person is certain himself [of it]. For example, the person is a scholar and is able to identify a mujtahid and the most learned; 2. two learned and dutiful (ʿādil) people who are able to distinguish a mujtahid and the most learned (two dutiful experts) confirm that someone is a mujtahid or the most learned, provided that two other learned and dutiful people do not disagree with their statement. In fact, the ijtihād or the status of being the most learned of a person is also established by the statement of even one expert (ahl al‑khibrah) whom one trusts. In the event of a conflict between experts, the testimony of the group whose skill and expertise is greater is accepted, such that the likelihood of the testimony of this group of experts corresponding to reality is stronger than that of the other group, and this stronger likelihood causes the doubt and hesitation that was initially created due to the conflict between the statements of the two groups to be set aside, and the statement of the other group, in comparison with that group, is conventionally (ʿurfan) considered to be beyond doubt; 3. a person attains confidence (iṭmiʾnān) that a person is a mujtahid or the most learned by rational means. For example, a group of scholars who are able to distinguish a mujtahid and the most learned and from whose statements one gains confidence confirm that someone is a mujtahid or the most learned. It is worth mentioning that if none of these ways for determining the most learned mujtahid is possible, a duty-bound person (mukallaf) must act according to the explanation that will be given in Ruling 13 regarding the death of a source of emulation (marjaʿ).

The opinions that a mujtahid mentions in his Tawḍīḥ al-Masāʾil are generally of three types: (a) fatwa; (b) obligatory precaution (al-iḥtiyāṭ al-wājib) or necessary precaution (al-iḥtiyāṭ al-lāzim); (c) recommended precaution (al-iḥtiyāṭ al-mustaḥabb). Expressions such as ‘it is obligatory’, ‘it is forbidden’, ‘it is permissible’, ‘it is not permissible’, ‘the stronger opinion (aqwā) is’, ‘it is more apparent (aẓhar)’, ‘it is apparent (ẓāhir)’, ‘it is closer (aqrab)’, and ‘it is not farfetched (baʿīd)’ are considered fatwas, which a follower (muqallid) acts upon. If the most learned mujtahid (aʿlam) gives a fatwa on a matter, a follower cannot act upon another mujtahid’s fatwa in that matter. The explanation for cases (b) and (c) will follow in Rulings 10 and 11.

If the most learned mujtahid (a person’s source of emulation [marjaʿ al-taqlīd]) does not give a fatwa on a matter and says that based on precaution, such and such action must be taken, the follower (muqallid) must either act according to this precaution – which is known as ‘obligatory precaution’ (al-iḥtiyāṭ al-wājib) or ‘necessary precaution’ (al-iḥtiyāṭ al-lāzim) – or they must act according to the fatwa of another mujtahid in this matter, while observing the rule of ‘the next most learned’ (al-aʿlam fal-aʿlam). For example: a. If the most learned mujtahid says: ‘Based on obligatory precaution, in the first and second units (rakʿah) of a prayer, a person must recite a chapter (surah) after Sūrat al-Ḥamd’, the follower must either act according to this precaution or act according to the fatwa of another mujtahid, while observing the rule of ‘the next most learned’. Therefore, if the other mujtahid regards the recitation of only Sūrat al-Ḥamd as being sufficient, the person can follow him in this matter and choose not to recite the other surah. b. If the most learned mujtahid says: ‘Based on obligatory precaution, the object on which a person intends to perform dry ablution (tayammum) must have dust that sticks to the hand’, the follower must either act according to this precaution and refrain from performing tayammum on a stone that has no dust, or act according to the fatwa of another mujtahid, while observing the rule of ‘the next most learned’. Therefore, if the other mujtahid considers tayammum on a stone without dust to be valid (ṣaḥīḥ), the person can follow him in this matter and perform tayammum on a stone that does not have dust. Similarly, expressions such as ‘this matter is one of deliberation’ (maḥall al-taʾammul), ‘this matter is problematic’ (maḥall al-ishkāl), ‘this action is problematic’, or ‘this action is not devoid of problem’ also have the same status as obligatory precaution. For example, if the most learned mujtahid says: ‘If a lessor (muʾjir) rents out their house for less than the standard rate (ujrat al-mithl) and stipulates in the lease contract that the lessee (mustaʾjir) must give them a sum of money as a loan, this loan is suspected of being usury (ribā) and is problematic (maḥall al-ishkāl) as a matter of religious duty (taklīfan)’, then the follower must refrain from renting out or renting a house in this manner, or they must act according to the fatwa of another mujtahid, while observing the rule of ‘the next most learned’. Therefore, if the next most learned mujtahid permits renting in this manner and does not consider it to be usury, the person can act according to the aforementioned method.

If after giving a fatwa on a matter, the most learned mujtahid (aʿlam) expresses precaution regarding that same matter – for example, he says: ‘An impure (najis) utensil that is washed once in kurr water becomes pure (ṭāhir), although based on precaution it should be washed three times’ – his follower (muqallid) can choose not to act according to that precaution. This type of precaution is called ‘recommended precaution’ (al‑iḥtiyāṭ al‑mustaḥabb). This ruling also applies in cases where the precaution regarding a matter is mentioned first and is followed by the mujtahid’s fatwa regarding that same matter; for example, he says: ‘Based on precaution, in the third and fourth units (rakʿah) of a prayer, one should recite the four glorifications (al-tasbīḥāt al-arbaʿah) three times, although reciting them once is sufficient.’

There are four ways to obtain the opinion and instruction of a mujtahid regarding religious laws (whether it be a fatwa, obligatory precaution [al-iḥtiyāṭ al-wājib], or recommended precaution [al-iḥtiyāṭ al-mustaḥabb]): 1. hearing it from the mujtahid himself; 2. hearing it from two dutiful (ʿādil) people who narrate the mujtahid’s fatwa; 3. hearing it from someone whose word one has confidence in; 4. reading it in the mujtahid’s manual of Islamic rulings (risālah) or a written response to a legal inquiry (istiftāʾ), on condition that one has confidence in the manual or the istiftāʾ being correct. As long as a person is not certain that the mujtahid’s fatwa has changed, they can act according to what is written in their manual of Islamic rulings; and if they deem it probable that the fatwa has changed, it is not necessary to investigate.

If a mujtahid whom a person is following dies, his authority after his death is the same as his authority when he was alive. Therefore, if that mujtahid is more learned (*aʿlam*) than a living mujtahid, and a *mukallaf* has a general notion about there being a difference of opinion between the two mujtahids in rulings (*masāʾil*) that they commonly encounter – even though they may not know what these differences are – they must continue following him. However, in the event that a living mujtahid is more learned than the deceased mujtahid, they must refer to the living mujtahid. If it is not known who the most learned among them is, or if they are equal [in knowledge], then in case it is established that one of them is more cautious – in the sense that he exercises more caution in matters pertaining to giving fatwas and deriving legal opinions, and is a person who thoroughly researches and investigates – the *mukallaf* must follow him. If it is not established which one is more cautious, the *mukallaf* has the choice to act according to the fatwa of whichever of the two mujtahids they want, except in cases of ‘non-specific knowledge’ (*al-ʿilm al-ijmālī*) or ‘non-specific authority’ (*al-ḥujjah al-ijmāliyyah*) over responsibility, where based on obligatory precaution (*al-iḥtiyāṭ al-wājib*), the *mukallaf* must observe the fatwa of both. [For example, in a case where a person knows] an obligation is mandatory for them, but they do not know whether the prayer is obligatory for them in its complete (*tamām*) or shortened (*qaṣr*) form; therefore, the basis of the obligation is clear to them, but the specific requirement is vague. In this case, the requirement of precaution is that they perform the *ẓuhr* prayer in both the shortened and complete forms. However, if the case is not one of ‘non-specific knowledge’, such as where the *mukallaf* does not have knowledge of the basis of the obligation and the obligation itself is doubted and has not been established by a valid authority, then observing this precaution is not necessary in that case. As an example, consider a car that was commensurate with one’s status and used for personal and family purposes, and was thus considered part of one’s ‘provisions’ (*muʾnah*), which the individual purchased from their income during the year. They sell this car after several years of use without any increase in its price. In this case, the first mujtahid says, ‘The money from the sale of the car is not subject to *khums*,’ and the second mujtahid says, ‘The money from the sale of the car is subject to *khums*.’ Therefore, in this case, the *mukallaf* is in doubt regarding the basis of the obligation and does not know whether paying *khums* is obligatory for them or not. In such a situation, if the two aforementioned mujtahids are equal in their level of learning and precision – or are ruled to be equal as explained in the text – the individual can follow the mujtahid who says, ‘The aforementioned money is not subject to *khums*,’ and it is not necessary to act according to precaution and pay *khums* on it. Furthermore, if the case is one of non-specific knowledge but the non-specific knowledge is not ‘binding’ (*manjaz*), observing precaution is not necessary; for example, a case where the obligation is doubted between two matters that are ‘lesser and greater’ (*aqall wa akthar*). In this regard, two examples are mentioned: a. If one mujtahid says, ‘It is obligatory for the person praying to say *al-tasbīḥāt al-arbaʿah* three times in the third and fourth *rakʿahs*,’ and the other mujtahid says, ‘Saying it once is sufficient,’ then in this case, if the two aforementioned mujtahids are equal or ruled to be equal, the *mukallaf* can follow the mujtahid who considers saying *al-tasbīḥāt al-arbaʿah* once to be sufficient. b. If one mujtahid says, ‘In *wuḍūʾ*, wiping the foot (*masḥ*) from the tip of one of the toes to the mound on the top of the foot is sufficient,’ and the other mujtahid says, ‘Wiping the foot from the tip of one of the toes to the mound on the top of the foot is not sufficient, and in addition to that, the top of the foot must be wiped up to the joint,’ then if the two aforementioned mujtahids are equal or ruled to be equal, the *mukallaf* can follow the mujtahid who considers wiping the foot up to the mound to be sufficient. However, if one of the two mujtahids is more learned than the other, the *mukallaf* must act according to the fatwa of the most learned one. It is worth mentioning that for further information regarding the precise cases where precaution is or is not necessary, one should refer to specialized books of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) or ask scholars. It is also worth mentioning that the meaning of ‘taqlīd’ at the beginning of this ruling is an undertaking and commitment to follow the fatwa of a particular mujtahid during the time he is alive; acting according to his instructions is not necessary for taqlīd to be established.

If a person remains on the taqlīd of a deceased mujtahid without the permission of a living mujtahid, they are like someone who acts without taqlīd; and such a person must, in the matter of remaining on the taqlīd of a deceased marjaʿ, refer to a living mujtahid who fulfils the conditions and follow them.

If a discerning minor (*mumayyiz*) performs *taqlīd*, their *taqlīd* is valid (*ṣaḥīḥ*). Therefore, if a *mujtahid* whom a person followed before their *bulūgh* dies, the ruling for them is the same as the ruling for those who have reached *bulūgh* that was mentioned in Ruling 13, except with regard to the obligatoriness of observing precaution between two opinions in cases of ‘non-specific knowledge’ (*al‑ʿilm al‑ijmālī*) or ‘non-specific authority’ (*al‑ḥujjah al‑ijmāliyyah*), as precaution is not obligatory for them before the age of *bulūgh*.

It is necessary for a mukallaf to learn those rulings that they are likely to encounter (maḥall al-ibtilā) and which they consider they probably need to learn in order to avoid omitting an obligatory act or performing a prohibited act due to not having learned them. For example, two mujtahids might give a fatwa regarding a person who has gone for hajj and performed a prohibited act from among the ‘prohibitions of iḥrām’ (muḥarramāt al-iḥrām) during the hajj rituals (manāsik), stating in the form of a jurisprudential ruling: ‘A person who performs such-and-such prohibited act from among the prohibitions of iḥrām must pay an expiation (kaffārah).’ However, the two mujtahids may differ in determining the type of kaffārah and specify it in a separate fatwa other than the first ruling. For instance, one of the two mujtahids might say: ‘A mukallaf who performs this prohibited act from among the prohibitions of iḥrām must fast for three days,’ while the other mujtahid says: ‘A mukallaf who performs this prohibited act from among the prohibitions of iḥrām must give alms (ṣadaqah).’ Furthermore, the aforementioned kaffārah is a ‘fixed obligation’ (taʿyīnī) according to both fatwas, not an ‘alternative obligation’ (takhyīrī). In this case, if the instance of kaffārah is not among the certainties and established matters of jurisprudence, the mukallaf does not have [specific] knowledge that an obligation (taklīf) has been placed upon them; however, based on the statements of two mujtahids who are equal or effectively equal in their level of learning and precision, the basis of the kaffārah being obligatory (wājib) is established for them, but they do not know whether it is three days of fasting or giving ṣadaqah to the poor (fuqarāʾ). Therefore, the instance of the obligation is non-specific (mujmal) for them. In this case, observing the requirements of precaution (iḥtiyāṭ) is for the person to both fast for three days and give ṣadaqah. It is worth mentioning that other explanations regarding non-specific legal proof (ḥujjah ijmāliyyah) are similar to non-specific knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ijmālī), which we will not mention for the sake of brevity. To learn more about the precise instances where precaution is or is not necessary, one must refer to specialized books of jurisprudence or ask the people of learning (ahl al-ʿilm).

If a person comes across a matter for which they do not know the ruling, it is necessary for them to act with caution or to follow a mujtahid according to the aforementioned conditions. However, in the event that they do not have access to the fatwa of the most learned (aʿlam) mujtahid in that matter, it is permitted (jāʾiz) for them to follow a mujtahid other than the most learned, while observing the sequence of the next most learned (al-aʿlam fal-aʿlam).

If someone relates a mujtahid’s fatwa to a second person, in the event that the mujtahid’s fatwa changes, it is not necessary for him to inform that second person that the fatwa of the mujtahid has changed. However, if after relating a fatwa, a person realises that he has made a mistake and his statement will cause that second person to act against his legal duty, he must, based on obligatory precaution, rectify his mistake if possible.

If for some time a mukallaf performs their actions without following a mujtahid (taqlīd), or if they follow someone and after some time realize that it was not their duty to follow them, three situations are envisioned for them: 1. Their actions were performed in accordance with the actual [divine] law or the fatwa of a mujtahid who at present could be their marjaʿ al-taqlīd and whom they are obliged to follow. In this case, their past actions are valid (ṣaḥīḥ). 2. Their actions were not in accordance with the actual [divine] law or the fatwa of such a mujtahid (mentioned in part 1). This situation has four cases: a. The defect in the action relates to the elemental components (arkān) and suchlike. In this case, the action is invalid (bāṭil); for example, if the person performing the prayer did not perform the takbīrat al-iḥrām or rukūʿ, or if they performed it sitting when their duty was to perform it standing, or if they performed the prayer with an invalid wuḍūʾ, ghusl, or tayammum. b. The defect in the action does not relate to the elemental components (arkān) and suchlike, and the person was inculpably ignorant (al-jāhil al-qāṣir), meaning they were not negligent or remiss in learning the ruling. In this case, the action is valid (ṣaḥīḥ); for example, if the person performing the prayer recited Sūrat al-Ḥamd and the [second] surah, or the dhikr of rukūʿ or sujūd, or the tashahhud of their prayer incorrectly, and they were not negligent or remiss in learning them and were not culpable for not knowing them; or if the person performing the prayer did not place their hands or big toes on the ground while in sujūd and was not culpable for not knowing or learning this ruling. c. The defect in the action does not relate to the elemental components (arkān) and suchlike, but the person was culpably ignorant (al-jāhil al-muqaṣṣir) – meaning they were negligent in learning the ruling and in not knowing it – and the case is one where the incorrect action of a culpably ignorant person causes it to be invalid. In this case, the action is invalid (bāṭil); such as the examples in part (b) with respect to a person performing the prayer who was negligent in learning the ruling and was culpable. d. The defect in the action does not relate to the elemental components (arkān) and suchlike, but the person was culpably ignorant, and the defect is of the type that even not knowing the ruling without an excuse and out of negligence does not cause the action to be invalid. In this case, the action is valid (ṣaḥīḥ), although such a person is a sinner for not learning the ruling they required. For example, if a man or a woman, due to not knowing the ruling, recited Sūrat al-Ḥamd and the [second] surah of the ẓuhr and ʿaṣr prayers aloud (jahr), or if a man, due to not knowing the ruling, recited Sūrat al-Ḥamd and the [second] surah of the maghrib and ʿishāʾ prayers in a whisper (ikhfāt), or if a person recited the al-tasbīḥāt al-arbaʿah of their prayers aloud due to not knowing the ruling, the prayer they performed is valid, even if the person was negligent and culpable in learning the ruling. 3. The person does not know the quality of their past actions; for example, they do not remember whether or not they performed their prayers correctly in the early period after reaching the age of legal responsibility (bulūgh), or whether or not they observed their fasts correctly, but they consider it reasonably likely that they performed those actions correctly. In this case as well, their past actions are deemed to be valid, apart from a few cases mentioned in more detailed books.

If a duty-bound person (mukallaf) has acted contrary to obligatory precaution (al‑iḥtiyāṭ al‑wājib), then in order for their previous action – in which they did not observe the said precaution – to be valid (ṣaḥīḥ), they can now refer to another qualified mujtahid, observing the order of the next most learned (al‑aʿlam fal‑aʿlam). For example, if a person, due to ignorance of the ruling, used to wipe the feet in ablution (wuḍūʾ) up to the protrusion of the foot, and after some time realizes that based on obligatory precaution the wiping must be continued up to the joint, then if the next most learned mujtahid considers wiping up to the protrusion of the foot to be sufficient, it is enough for them to refer to him now in order to validate their previous prayers.

If a person is asked about the religious law (ḥukm) of a matter (masʾalah), if there is an indication or evidence, or if the person’s apparent state is such that they are asking about the fatwa of their own source of emulation (marjaʿ), one must answer in accordance with the fatwa of their marjaʿ. Otherwise, one may provide the answer to the religious matter in accordance with the opinion of the marjaʿ whose fatwa is legally authoritative (al-ḥujjah al-sharʿiyyah) for the questioner.

If a person is appointed as an agent (*wakīl*) to perform an act, in the event that the legal opinion of the agent’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* differs from that of the principal (*muwakkil*) regarding the rulings related to the subject of the agency (*wikālah*), the agent must act according to the legal opinion of the principal’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd*, unless they are legally (*sharʿan*) responsible for the ‘act itself or its effects’, in which case it is necessary to observe the opinion of both their own *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* and that of the principal. This ruling also applies to a person who has appointed someone as their executor (*waṣī*). To clarify the matter, several examples are mentioned: Example 1: A man and a woman appoint someone as an agent to recite the marriage contract (*ʿaqd*). The *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* of the said man and woman does not consider reciting the contract in Persian to be valid (*ṣaḥīḥ*), whereas the agent’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* considers it valid. In this case, the agent must recite the contract in Arabic. Example 2: A woman appoints a man as her agent to marry her to himself. The woman’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* considers reciting the contract in Persian to be valid, but the man’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* considers it invalid (*bāṭil*). In this case, the man must perform the contract in Arabic so that he can apply the effects of marriage, such as *maḥram* status, with respect to the said marriage. Example 3: If a principal intends to take a loan from a private bank and their *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* does not consider a loan conditional on a service charge (for example, a 4% service charge) or a penalty for late payment of debt to be usury (*ribā*), but the agent’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* considers it usurious, the agent cannot accept such an agency, as such an agency results in committing a prohibited (*ḥarām*) act (concluding a usurious loan). Example 4: A person who intends to lease their house on the condition of a loan (*rahn*) and, according to the opinion of their *marjaʿ*, a lease conditional on a loan is not usury; if they appoint someone as an agent to conclude the contract whose *marjaʿ* considers a lease conditional on a loan to be usury, the agent cannot proceed to conclude the said contract. Example 5: A person who has three months of lapsed (*qaḍāʾ*) fasts and makes a will (*waṣiyyah*) that the executor should hire (*ajīr*) themselves or someone else from one-third of their estate to perform the lapsed fasts; if the *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* of the testator considers it necessary in representative lapsed fasting for the representative (*nāʾib*) to have the intention (*niyyah*) for the fast from the time of the morning call to prayer (*adhān*), but the executor’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* does not consider this necessary and considers the intention for representative fasting before the time of legal midday (*al-ẓuhr al-sharʿī*) to be sufficient; in the event that the executor themselves is hired to perform the lapsed fasts of the deceased, they must make the intention from the morning *adhān*, and if they hire someone else, they must ask them to have the intention for the fast from the morning *adhān* and not delay the intention. Example 6: A person who is liable for non-intentional expiation (*kaffārah*) for fasting and, according to the opinion of their *marjaʿ al-taqlīd*, it is sufficient to feed a poor person (*faqīr*) to satiety (*ishbāʿ*) to discharge it, makes a will that the executor should prepare food from one-third of their estate and feed the poor to satiety for the expiation; however, the executor’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* does not consider it sufficient and considers the transfer of ownership (*tamlīk*) of one *mudd* of food to a poor person to be necessary for discharging the non-intentional expiation; in this case, the executor can act according to the opinion of the testator’s *marjaʿ al-taqlīd* and suffice with feeding the poor to satiety without transferring ownership of a *mudd* of food to them.

If a transaction is carried out and, for example, the seller is a muqallid of a mujtahid who considers the aforementioned transaction to be valid (ṣaḥīḥ) and the buyer is a muqallid of a mujtahid who considers this transaction to be void (bāṭil), the seller can apply the effects of validity with respect to the transaction; however, for the buyer, the transaction is considered void. This ruling also applies to other contracts, such as leasing (ijārah), sleeping partnership (muḍārabah), marriage, and so on.

Upon the death of a mujtahid, those who were agents (*wakīl*) or had permission (*idhn*) from him for matters such as receiving or transferring religious dues (*al-wujūhāt al-sharʿiyyah*), appointing a guardian (*qayyim*) for legally incapacitated individuals (*mahjūrīn*), appointing a trustee (*mutawallī*) for charitable endowments (*awqāf*) and the like, or having disposal over the affairs of legally incapacitated individuals or charitable endowments and suchlike, their agency (*wikālah*) or permission becomes void (*bāṭil*). To obtain agency or permission to perform these tasks, they must refer to a living mujtahid who fulfils the [necessary] conditions. However, if the mujtahid or his agent had appointed a person or persons as a trustee of an endowment or a guardian of legally incapacitated individuals and the like, then after the death of that mujtahid, the issue regarding whether such an appointment becomes void or remains [valid] is problematic (*maḥall al‑ishkāl*), and the requirements of precaution must not be abandoned.

With regard to many of the recommended acts (mustaḥabbāt) mentioned in this manual, their recommendation is based on a principle called the ‘principle of leniency in evidence for recommended acts’ (qāʾidat al-tasāmuḥ fī adillat al-sunan). As this principle is not established with us, if a mukallaf wishes to perform them, it is necessary that they do so ‘rajāʾan’, i.e. in the hope that they are desired. The rule regarding many disapproved acts (makrūhāt) is the same, and they should avoid them ‘rajāʾan’, i.e. in the hope that their avoidance is desired.